

Accusative marking – Nominal mood in A'ingae*

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This paper argues that the language isolate A'ingae, which is spoken in Ecuador and Colombia, encodes reality status in the nominal domain. It features the two accusative clitics =ma and =ve, which differ as to whether they present a nominal referent as real or not. The so-called accusative 2 clitic =ve marks p-arguments for irrealty, whereas the accusative 1 clitic =ma marks p-arguments for reality. A difference is drawn between absolute (ir)reality status, which is evaluated with regards to the moment of speaking, and relative reality status, which is evaluated with regards to a different temporal reference point. Furthermore, this paper demonstrates that the accusative 2 clitic =ve is used in several other functions. These include the marking of the nominal argument in negative existentials, as well as depictive secondary arguments, resultatives and in a construction preliminarily labelled as purposives. These usages may be diachronically related to the expression of irreal p-argument and a tentative grammaticalization cline for this relation is presented.

1 Introduction

This paper deals with the marking of reality status in the nominal domain in A'ingae, a language isolate spoken in the Sucumbíos province of Ecuador and the Nariño and Putumayo provinces of Colombia (Adelaar & Muysken 2004: 615). In the literature both the language and the ethnic group speaking it are often referred to with the exonyms Cofán and Kofán.

P-arguments can be marked with either of two case clitics in A'ingae: accusative 1 (=ma) or accusative 2 (=ve). The choice between the two is not governed by the semantics of the verbal predicate whose argument they are but is rather employed to express the reality status of the nominal referent. In Section 2, the terms reality and irrealty will be defined, paying special attention to the distinction between the marking of relative and absolute reality. The following section offers some remarks on the general typological features of A'ingae and a formal description of the two markers under investigation, before in Section 4

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their usage domains as markers of p-arguments will be contrasted in order to demonstrate their function of encoding reality status. Section 5 deals with the other functions that the accusative 2 clitic can have: marking the second argument in resultatives and in purposives, as well as marking depictive secondary predicates. Section 6 discusses the finding that A'ingae grammatically encodes nominal mood in relation to other languages and offers some concluding remarks.

The examples that my analysis will rely on are taken from a corpus of legends told by Enrique Criollo, which was first presented in Borman (1990). In this corpus, there were 406 instances of the accusative 1 marker =*ma* and 149 instances of the accusative 2 marker =*ve*. All these examples are tagged with the abbreviation 'BC' followed by a numeric identifier. All data from other sources are referenced accordingly in the standard way. A list of the abbreviations used in the glosses can be found at the end of the paper, in Section 7.

2 Realis and irrealis

(Ir)reality (status) with its two grammemes *realis* and *irrealis* is usually seen as a verbal category in the literature. Elliott (2000) treats reality status as a category of its own distinct from mood as the grammaticalized distinction between different speech act types on the one hand and from modality as the speaker's qualification of a proposition or event on the other hand (p. 69). Reality status, in turn, is the means by which the situatedness of a proposition in a "real world" or an "unreal world" is expressed linguistically (Elliott 2000: 66, using Roberts' 1990 terminology). Others, while still accrediting the notion of reality status, rather treat it as a sub-category of modality, such as Noonan (2007), or as a subcategory of mood, such as Hengeveld (2011), instead of seeing it as a grammatical category of its own.

Noonan (2007) differentiates three types of dependency relation that a complement can have with its complement-taking predicate: time-reference dependency, truth-value dependency and discourse dependency. What is important here is that, as the terms suggest, the marking in the complements, whether verbal or nominalized, depends on the semantics of the complement-taking predicate and not the complement per se. Reality status is treated as a manifestation of truth-value dependency where the form chosen in the complement depends on the truth-value of the proposition expressed by the matrix predicate. *Realis* complements tend to express assertions, reports of assertion, positive propositional attitudes or backgrounds, whereas *irrealis* complements tend to express negative propositional attitudes, hypothetical propositions, commands, requests, intentions and desires (Noonan 2007: 106).

Based on a small typological sample, Elliott (2000) concludes that the exact semantic delimitations between *realis* and *irrealis*, given a language makes such a

distinction, vary and that the interplay of their distribution with other grammatical categories can vary, as well. However, she provides useful working definitions of the terms, which capture the semantic core of these notions:

“A REALIS proposition prototypically asserts that an event or state is an actualised or certain fact of reality; [...] an IRREALIS proposition prototypically implies an event belongs to the realm of the imagined or hypothetical, and as such it constitutes a potential or possible event but it is not an observable fact of reality.” (Elliott 2000: 66–67)

Elliott (2000: 68) observes that, unlike in tenseless languages, in languages with tense the “location of an event in time relative to the moment of speech is not usually crucial to the choice between realis and irrealis”. Hengeveld (2011) extends this notion of the moment of speech being relevant for the marking of reality status by introducing the terms relative and absolute (ir)reality. Parallel to the distinction between relative and absolute tense in Functional Discourse Grammar (Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2009), absolute (ir)reality is associated with the layer of the Episode and relative (ir)reality is situated at the layer of the State-of-affairs. This means that absolute (ir)reality is used to express the reality status with respect to the moment of speaking while relative (ir)reality expresses the reality status of single States-of-affairs with respect to another temporal reference point. Spanish offers examples in which reality status is marked in the verbal domain. The application of either relative or absolute reality is lexically governed by conjunctions. In subordinate clauses with *antes de que* ‘before’ the verb takes subjunctive marking both when it has past reference and the State-of-affairs has been completed as in (1) as well as when it refers to the future as in (2) (De Bruyne 1995: 485). The subordinate clause is always marked for relative irreality based on the reference time of the main predicate.

(1) Spanish (Romance, Indo-European)

Los	generales	llegaron	antes.de.que	lo
the	generals	arrive.PST.PFV.3.PL	before	it
hiciera	la	caravana fúnebre		
make.PST.SUBJ.3SG	the	funeral procession		

‘The generals arrived before the funeral procession did so.’

(CREA – newspaper article, Colombia)

(2) Spanish (Romance, Indo-European)

Las cosas	se	pondrán	peor
the things	REFL	put.FUT.3PL	worse

antes.de.que	mejore
before	get_better.PRS.SUBJ.3SG

‘Things will get worse before it gets better.’

(CREA – newspaper article, Colombia)

The conjunction *hasta que* ‘until’, on the other hand, triggers marking for absolute reality based on the moment of speaking. In (3), *llegó* surfaces as indicative rather than as the subjunctive **llegara* since at the moment of speaking the State-of-affairs has taken place already. In (4), the subordinate verb appears in the subjunctive because it refers to a future event.

(3) Spanish (Romance, Indo-European)

Nada	parecido	le	había	sucedido
nothing	similar	DAT	have.IMPF.IND.3SG	happened

a	este	deporte	hasta.que	llegó	Tiger Woods
to	this	sport	until	arrive.PST.IND.3SG	Tiger Woods

‘Nothing similar had happened to this sport until Tiger Woods arrived.’

(CREA – newspaper article, Colombia)

(4) Spanish (Romance, Indo-European)

Se	deja	calentar	hasta.que	hierva
REFL	let.PRS.IND.3SG	heat.INF	until	boil.PRS.SUBJ.3SG

‘One lets it get hot until it is boiling.’

(CREA – newspaper article, Colombia)

3 Morphosyntactic characteristics

The constituent order of A’ingae is quite flexible in main clauses, with S-O-predicate being the dominant one. In (co)subordinate clauses, the constituent order is fixed and rigidly predicate-final. A prevalent morphosyntactic trait throughout the language is what I call here constituent dropping. Any clausal constituent that can be inferred from the discourse context can be suppressed (Fischer & Hengeveld *forthc.*: 47–48). This feature will be crucial to some of the arguments I make in Section 5.

In terms of parts of speech, there are several classes of stems in A’ingae, the most sizeable ones of which are nominal stems and verbal stems. A difference

between the two is drawn on prosodic as well as on morphological grounds. Morphologically speaking, a specific set of markers can only combine with verbal stems, whereas others can only combine with nominal ones (Fischer & Hengeveld forthc.: 16). In underived form, only nouns and pronouns can appear as the head of a noun phrase. Verbs and other types of stems need additional derivational morphology to take this function (Fischer & Hengeveld forthc.: 20–24). In the following, I will further elaborate on the structure of nominal phrases, paying special attention to the accusative markers.

The markers analyzed in this paper, the accusative 1 marker =*ma* and the accusative 2 marker =*ve*, are two out of the ten case clitics in A'ingae. Whereas the accusative 1 clitic always surfaces in the form =*ma*, the accusative 2 clitic =*ve* has an allomorph =*me* which is the result of progressive nasal assimilation triggered by a preceding nasal vowel. This phenomenon is not specific to this marker, but a phonological process applying consistently in A'ingae (Fischer & Hengeveld forthc.: 5–6).

In terms of their morphosyntactic behavior, there is no difference between the accusative 1 and the accusative 2 clitics. Both case markers encliticize to the right of the NP when it is being used in a clause. The modified NP itself can be internally complex and the case markers can be separated from the nominal head by up to three elements. These three slots can be occupied by the following three types of functional elements in decreasing proximity to the nominal head (slot 0): modifiers (slot +1), enclitics of number and size (slot +2), and the nominal past enclitic =*'ye*/=*'ñe* (slot +3). All these elements can occur in an NP but not every slot has to be occupied (Fischer & Hengeveld forthc.: 19–30). (5) shows an example where the NP joined by the accusative 1 clitic only consists of a nominal head *kumba* 'tobacco'.

- (5) an nani=*mba* tse'i kumba=*ma* chhatû
 eat finish=*ss* then tobacco=*ACC1* cut
 'When they were finished eating, they cut tobacco.'
 (BC15.089)

In (6), the headless relative clause is more complex and consists of *dyai* 'sit' modified by the subordinator =*chu* in slot +1. Still =*ma* cliticizes to the right of the complex.

- (6) an nani=mba sefani dyai=chu=ma
 eat finish=ss sky sit=sub=acc1
 shun'chan vaju
 smell demon
 'When he was done eating, the demon smelled the one sitting in the palm tree.'
 (BC17.059)

Another type of modifier in slot +1 that can precede the case clitics is the adjectivalizer =a, as can be seen in (7). In this example, the head noun is suppressed and the accusative 2 marker cliticizes to the right edge of this NP.

- (7) tshipa=khia=ka=un san=tshi=a=ve me'i='un
 be_wet=SIMIL=CMP=ADVR DRY=QUAL=ADJR=ACC2 NEGP=ADVR
 'It was like mud, there was no dry matter.'
 (BC01.012)

An example of an enclitic of number or size that modifies the nominal head in slot +2 is the human plural clitic =ndekhû in (8). Again, the accusative 1 marker cliticizes to the right of the resulting NP *dû'shû=ndekhû*.

- (8) sumbu=mbi=si chan iyikha'ye=pa tise
 emerge=NEG=DS mother become_angry=ss 3.SG
 dû'shû=ndekhû=ma ma'phi
 child=H.PL=ACC1 whip
 'When it didn't emerge, the mother was angry and beat her children.'
 (BC08.027)

Case clitics are not always the last element in nominal complexes. In addition to them, an NP that is embedded in a clause can also bear focus and givenness clitics. These appear to the right of the case markers (Fischer & Hengeveld forthc.: 32), as can be seen in (9). Here, the additive focus clitic =khe and the new topic clitic =ta follow the accusative 1 clitic.

- (9) chiga=ma=khe=ta tayupi=ta a'ndû khen-'chu-'khu
 god=ACC1=ADD=NEW already=NEW wear thus-NR.RND-NR.ANG
 kukama ñuña=mba afe-chu chiga
 white_man make-CAUS=SS give-NR.RND god
 'They used to wear gods (crucifixes) around their necks long ago – about
 this big – gods that the white man made and gave to them.'
 (BC24.024)

4 P-argument marking

This section serves to contrast the different usage contexts of the accusative 1 and the accusative 2 clitic. Both the clitics =*ma* and =*ve* mark p-arguments of transitive verbs. Their distribution is not governed lexically since they can both occur with the argument of the same lexical verb in the same discourse contexts, as with *shu'khu* 'cook' in examples (10) and (11).

- (10) aru=ma shu'khu-en
 rice=ACC1 cook-CAUS
 'He cooked rice.'
 (BC21.024)
- (11) sangu-'chu=ve shu'khu-en
 mash-NR.RND=ACC2 cook-CAUS
 'He cooked mashed round things (mashed plantains).'
 (BC21.025)

The choice of the marker depends on the reality status of the referent marked for either accusative 1 or 2 at the reference time of the State-of-affairs and is not directly governed by the verbal semantics or verbal markers such as the causative suffix. In (10), at the beginning of the event the rice already exists and is real, whereas in (11) the plantains have not been mashed before they are being cooked and consequently the 'mashed round things' are non-existent. This semantic difference is formally expressed by the choice of the accusative marker. The real referent *aru* 'rice' is marked for accusative 1 =*ma* and the unreal referent *sangu-'chu* 'mashed round things' takes the accusative 2 clitic =*ve*.

Whereas some verbs can occur with both types of p-arguments, some others are not as free in their combinability. Certain verbs like *fî'thi* 'to kill' always take an argument marked for accusative 1, see examples (12)–(14), while a single p-argument of *ñuña* 'to make' must always occur in accusative 2, as in (15) and (16). This combinability, however, is not due to lexical restrictions but rather the

result of the same underlying mechanism as in (10) and (11). The p-argument of ‘to kill’ must be asserted to be a real referent in order for the proposition to be logically possible. For *ñuña*, the opposite applies. Before the event takes place, the referent of the p-argument necessarily must not exist yet, in order for it to be possible to be made. The consequence is that single p-arguments of *ñuña* are marked for accusative 2 and p-arguments of *fi’thi* are marked for accusative 1.

- (12) khaki kuse intindi=ma fi’t’hi
 next_day night bird=ACC1 kill
 ‘The next night he killed an intindi bird.’
 (BC22.001)

- (13) ingi seje=chu a’i tetete athe=pa afa
 1.PL heal-IMP=SUB person savage see=SS say
 ingi=ma fithi~thi-je
 1.PL=ACC1 kill~ITER-IMP
 ‘The savages saw this and said, ‘The person that we trained as a shaman is killing us.’’
 (BC12.099)

- (14) a’i=tsû ke=ma=nda fi’t’hi-ye tsun-je
 person=3 2SG=ACC1=NEW kill-INF go-IMP
 ‘A man is going to kill you.’
 (BC20.102)

- (15) u’ti=e=ta ai=ve ñuña-ñe ashaen=fa
 first=ADVR=NEW man=ACC2 make-INF begin=PLS
 ‘First, they began to make man.’
 (BC26.002)

- (16) a’i afa jû ande=ve ñuña-ñe=ngi ñumbiye=fa
 man say yes earth=ACC2 make-INF=1 be_good=PLS
 ‘The people answered, ‘Yes, we are sad and (we want you) to make some earth.’’
 (BC01.019)

A’ingae does not formally express absolute tense distinctions (Fischer & Hengeveld forthc.: 43) and temporal reference does not seem to influence the choice of the p-argument clitics. The same holds for clauses marked for imperfectivity. The argument of *fi’thi* takes the accusative 1 clitic =*ma*, no matter

if the event took place in the past and is completed at the moment of speaking, as in (12), or the utterance is referring to a future event and the verb is marked for imperfectivity, as in (13) and (15).

Similarly, the p-arguments of *ñuña* bear the accusative 2 clitic both when it refers to an event that took place before the time of utterance, as in (15), and when it refers to an uncompleted event at the time of utterance, as in (16).

The accusative 2 clitic seems to invariably encode relative irreality. All examples discussed so far mark irreality at the layer of the State-of-affairs. Even in examples like (11) where the referent undergoes a change of state and thus is real at the moment of speaking, the NPs take the accusative 2 clitic rather than accusative 1. This means that they are marked for irreality at the layer of the State-of-affairs rather than at that of the Episode. In the consulted corpus, no examples were present where a p-argument was marked for absolute irreality.

For the majority of NPs marked for accusative 1 it was impossible to judge if this marking was based on relative or absolute reality. As long as there is no change of state of the referent involved in the predication, its reality status must be asserted to be real both from a relative and an absolute reference point. Only in three cases, clearly absolute reality was encoded by the accusative 1 clitic. An example of that is given in (17). Here, the canoe does not exist yet at the referenced time, but only comes into existence as the consequence of the event. This means that it is marked for absolute reality since it only is real at the moment of speaking, but not at the layer of the State-of-affairs. In the similar example (15), however, relative irreality is marked by the accusative 2 clitic. This suggests that in these contexts, both marking for absolute reality and marking for relative irreality are in competition with each other, especially given the fact that the corpus also includes examples like (18), where *agathu* takes a p-argument marked for accusative 2. This possibility for alternative marking might be lexically driven, especially in light of the fact that the verb *ñuña* 'to make', which has a similar meaning, does not allow for this variation and always takes a p-argument marked for relative reality.

- (17) chiga shavu=ma agathu-en
 god canoe=ACC1 create-CAUS
 'God created a canoe for them.'
 (BC01.052)

- (18) matichi=ve agathu-en=mba afe a'i=nga
 machete=ACC2 create-CAUS=SS give man=DAT
 'He created machetes and gave them to the men.'
 (BC01.033)

Similar to (17), in (19) the p-argument *si'ingi=ma* does not exist until its ignition. Yet, it is marked for absolute reality although marking for accusative 2 based on a relative reference might be possible as well. However, this tentative assumption that examples (17) and (19) would allow for either of the accusative clitic on the p-argument does not have any validity until it is tested with native speakers.¹

- (19) khûtsû-an=mba si'ngi=ma setsa-en=fa
 stand-CAUS=SS fire=ACC1 ignite-CAUS=PLS
 ‘Then they lit it.’
 (BC17.096)

Other uses of the accusative 1 clitic, such as (20) clearly mark relative reality. In this example, the hair only exists as such before being burned. After the completion of the process of burning, i.e., also at the moment of speaking, it does not exist anymore. If absolute (ir)reality were the basis of the marking here, *tuse* ‘hair’ consequently would have to take the accusative 2 clitic to mark it for irreality. All other examples that were unambiguously encoding relative reality rather than absolute reality had either *fi'thi* ‘to kill’ or *an* ‘to eat’ as their predicate. In (21) the p-argument *a'i=ma* is marked for reality. From an absolute reference point, after the completion of the event, the people would have been eaten already and thus be unreal. Still, a relative reference point is the basis of the marking and *a'i=ma* is formally encoded as a real referent. A similar line of argumentation can also account for the marking of relative reality in (12).

- (20) gethi nani=mba mattsan=fa tuse=ma
 divide finish=SS singe=PLS hair=ACC1
 ‘Having split them they burned off the hair.’
 (BC19.016)

- (21) ji=pa kanda tayu=tsû kukuya an ingi a'i=ma
 come=SS tell already=3 demon eat 1.PL man=ACC1
 ‘He told the people, ‘A demon came and ate our people.’
 (BC17.075)

To summarize, both in cases where reality status is evaluated from a relative reference point and in cases where it is evaluated from an absolute reference point, the basic difference between the two available p-argument markers is that the

¹ Other than for *agathu* ‘to create’, the corpus does not contain both examples with accusative 1 and with accusative 2 marked p-arguments for *setsa* ‘to ignite’. Apart from (20), there is only one other example with an overt p-argument, which is also marked for accusative 1.

accusative 1 generally marks an NP the reality status of which is presented as real, whereas NPs marked for accusative 2 are assumed by the speaker to be unreal.

Accusative marking is not restricted to transitive predicates but also occurs with ditransitives. In (22) the ditransitive verb *afe* 'to give' takes a p-argument *fue libro si'an chipiri* 'one small black book', which is marked for accusative 1. The recipient is marked with the dative clitic *=nga*.

- (22) Juan=tsu ña=nga afe fue libro si'an chipiri=ma
 Juan=3 1SG=DAT give one book black small=ACC1
 'Juan gave me one small black book'
 (Fischer 2002: 42)

The functions of the accusative 1 marker to express reality and of the accusative 2 marker to express irreality can be seen in the contrastive example (23), where both forms occur within the same predication. The product of the transformation, *the'thu* 'tooth', which does not exist at the start of the State-of-affairs, takes the clitic *=ve*, marking it for relative irreality. The other p-argument *thekhûpaje* 'balsa', which is being transformed and exists beforehand, is marked for reality with the clitic *=ma*.

- (23) tsun=si thekhûphaje=ma ingi the'thu=ve ñuña tayu=e
 do=DS balsa=ACC1 1.PL tooth=ACC2 make already=ADVR
 'Then (God) made our (men's) teeth from balsa a long time ago.'
 (BC04.018)

A similar example in which both accusative clitics neatly contrast is (24). The two arguments 'long hair' and 'short hair' are marked based on their relative reality status. The NP *tose bia'a* 'long hair' as the real state before the transformation is marked for accusative 1 and *tose chipiri* 'short hair' as the result of the verbal action, which is not real at the beginning of the State-of-affairs, takes the accusative 2 clitic.

- (24) chattu-'fa=gi tose bia'a=ma tose chipiri=ve
 cut-PL=1 hair long=ACC1 hair short=ACC2
 'We cut his long hair short'
 (Fischer 2002: 28)

This functional difference between the accusative 1 and the accusative 2 clitic can also be seen in examples (10) and (11) at the beginning of this section. The p-argument *aru=ma*, which remains unchanged, is marked for accusative 1,

whereas the p-argument *sangu-‘chu=ve*, which is the result of a transformation, receives accusative 2 marking.

Apart from the prototypical use of the two accusative markers to encode p-arguments, the accusative 2 clitic is also used in negative existentials. Negative existentials are expressed using pseudo-transitive clauses. Their predicate is based on the root *me’/me’i* ‘no’. In examples (25) and (26), this root is suffixed with the augmentative clitic =*un* and the quality marker =*tshi*, respectively, making them non-verbal predicates (Fischer & Hengeveld forthc.: 46). These predicates take an NP marked for accusative 2 as their argument. As outlined in Section 2, the accusative 2 clitic may be followed by certain other elements, such as the additive focus clitic =*khe* in (26).

- (25) *khu’a=ve* *me’i=’un*
 squash=ACC2 NEGP=ADVR
 ‘There were no squash.’
 (BC07.043)

- (26) *ni* *kukama=me=khe* *me=tshi*.
 not.even white_man=ACC2=ADD NEGP=QUAL
 ‘There were not even white men.’
 (20040218-EC-Interview-031)²

Apart from these non-verbal predicates, it is also possible to express negative existentials with a verbal predicate. In this case, the same negative root *me’i* as in the non-verbal predicates is used. One option is to mark the negative root *me’i* with the verbal irrealis mood clitic =*ya*. Still, the p-argument of this pseudo-transitive verb takes the accusative 2 clitic =*ve*, see (27).

- (27) *kha=tsh=e* *me’i=ya’=ma=khe* *tsa’u=ve=khe*
 never=QUAL=ADVR NEGP=IRR=FRUS=ADD house=ACC2=ADD

 me’i=ya
 EGP=IRR
 ‘There was nothing, not even a house there.’
 (BC26.125)

In negative existentials, the negative verb can also occur as an infinitive when formally required to. In (28), the negative existential is used in a comparative adverbial clause and the negative verb appears as the infinitive marked by -*ye*

² This supplementary example is taken from the corpus gathered by Rafael Fischer in the Ecuadorian villages of Dureno, Sábalo and Sinango between the years 2001 and 2006.

making it an adverbial clause. This pseudo-transitive verb takes a p-argument marked for accusative 2 and the entire adverbial clause then takes the comparative clitic =*kan* (indicated by the word 'like' in the translation).

- (28) tsa=mbi=e=ka=nda ukû=ve me'i-ye=kan
 ANA=NEG=ADVR=CMP=NEW biting_gnat=ACC2 NEGP-INF=CMP
 'If it hadn't been like that, there wouldn't be any biting gnats.'
 (BC06.028)

In any case, in negative existentials, the second argument is invariably marked for accusative 2 and can never take the accusative 1. This is not the consequence of the negation itself but rather due to the reality status of the referent of the argument. Because the purpose of the construction is to deny its existence, the second argument thus logically cannot refer to a real existing entity. Following the same mechanism as described for p-arguments above, it must be marked for irrealty/accusative 2. Since the reality status of these non-existent referents does not change, all negative existentials are ambiguous with regards to whether they mark relative or absolute irrealty.

In other types of negated clauses other than negative existentials the accusative 1 clitic and the negator =*mbi* can co-occur, as illustrated in (29).

- (29) injama'chu=ma an=mbi
 heart=ACC1 eat=NEG
 'He didn't eat his heart.'
 (BC09.014)

In sentences like (29), p-arguments can take either the accusative 1 or accusative 2 clitic. Their distribution is governed by the same factors as in affirmative clauses. In the example at hand *injama'chu* refers to an existing heart, which had been mentioned before in the discourse context, and is marked for =*ma*.

As opposed to negative existentials, positive existentials on the other hand do not employ a pseudo-transitive verb and therefore have no second argument that would require either the accusative 1 or the accusative 2 clitic. There are several strategies to express positive existentials, one of which is illustrated in (30).

- (30) tse=ni tsa'u utha~:
 ANA.LOC=LOC house stand-DUR
 'There were houses standing.'
 (BC07.029)

5 Other uses

Apart from marking a second argument for irreality, the accusative 2 clitic has several other related functions in A'ingae: it occurs on NPs in depictive secondary predicates, resultatives and purposives. I will first define these terms before discussing their relevance for accusative 2 marking in A'ingae.

5.1 Secondary predicates

Depictives are defined as secondary predicates which express a State-of-affairs that holds at the same reference time as that expressed by the main predicate. Resultatives, on the other hand, express a result or consequence of the main predicate that consequently does not hold at the time of the main predicate but after it (Schultze-Berndt & Himmelmann 2004: 65–66). While depictives and resultatives have traditionally both been treated as secondary predicates, for some languages, like English or German, it has been argued that resultatives are not secondary predicates in the narrow sense (Schultze-Berndt & Himmelmann 2004: 66). An important difference is that secondary predicates are adjuncts, meaning that they can always be dropped without distorting the basic meaning of a sentence or rendering it ungrammatical. In some languages, resultatives can also be complements rather than adjuncts and therefore cannot be dropped, see the example from German in (31).

(31) German (Germanic, Indo-European)

- a. ich schreibe mir die Finger wund
 1SG.NOM write 1SG.DAT DEF fingers sore
 (lit.) 'I am writing my fingers sore.'

- b. *ich schreibe mir die Finger

(Schultze-Berndt & Himmelmann 2004: 66; from Kunze 1997: 327)

The crucial difference between adverbials and depictives is that the former are event-oriented, but the latter are participant-oriented. However, in languages that formally distinguish between secondary predicates and adverbials, these two construction types compete as to what semantic levels they are used to express (Schultze-Berndt & Himmelmann 2004: 120).

5.2 Resultatives in A'ingae

In A'ingae, resultative constructions expressing the change of state of a participant are encoded using the lexical verb *da* 'become'. The NP that denotes the result of the change is marked for accusative 2, whereas the undergoer of this

change formally is the subject and takes zero-marking as in (32) or remains unexpressed if the referent is clear from the discourse context as in (33) and (34).

- (32) kupaye=ve da dû'shû=ndekhû
 oriole=ACC2 become child=H.PL
 'The children became orioles.'
 (BC02.033)

- (33) tse'i tiriri=ve da
 then chipmunk=ACC2 become
 'Then he became a chipmunk.'
 (BC03.053)

- (34) asi'thaen junguesû=ve da=fa=ya'
 think IGN.INAN=ACC2 become=PLS=IRR
 'They thought, 'What shall we change ourselves into?''
 (BC08.035)

Such a resultative construction can also be expressed with the verb *di'sha* 'change into'. Again, the result of the change is marked for accusative 2, see (35).

- (35) ana-ye andûfa-khu phi-ña=ni=nda ana=mba
 sleep-INF carry-NR.ANG place-CAUS=LOC=NEW sleep=ss
 ana-je=nda kanjansi=ve=ta di'sha
 sleep-IMPF=NEW boa=ACC2=NEW change
 'But when it slept in the carrying sling it became a boa.'
 (BC14.036)

While in (34) it is not clear whether relative or absolute irrealis is being marked since the utterance is referring to a future event, (32), (33) and (35) undoubtedly encode relative irrealis of the referent. The change of state is situated in the past, meaning that the referents marked for accusative 2 must be real at the moment of speaking.

What is unclear, however, is if these resultative constructions should be considered secondary predicates or are in fact regular transitive verbs with their second argument marked for reality status, just like the predicates discussed in Section 4. As outlined above, what is crucial to come to a conclusion on this matter is whether the NP marked for accusative 2 is an adjunct or a complement. What makes this decision difficult is the phenomenon of constituent dropping. Because of this general property of A'ingae, it is unclear if in (36) and (37) a p-

argument has been suppressed, as indicated by the translation of (36) or if the sentences are grammatical even without a (dropped) second argument. This second option is indicated in example (37) by translating *di'sha* as 'change shape' into English. This question cannot satisfactorily be answered based on the available data. However, the first option is to be seen as more likely given the omnipresence of constituent dropping in A'ingae.

- (36) kuye-khû na'sû a'i pa=pa di'sha-ye
 plantain_field-NR.DEL owner person die=SS change-INF
 'The owner of the plantain field was a person who had died and changed
 (into a boa).'
 (BC18.001)

- (37) fijû a'jû-pa=chu=ma a'jû-pa di'sha=chu
 leaf emetic=NR=SUB=ACC1 vomit=SS change=SUB
 'Drinking the fiju emetic he could change shape.'
 (BC19.009)

The fact that there are only resultative constructions without an overt p-argument with the predicate *di'sha*, while *da* always appears with an argument, might suggest that *da* is a transitive verb with its complement taking accusative 2 marking, while the accusative 2 marked NP accompanying *di'sha* is an optional adjunct and thus a secondary predicate. Again, this is only a tentative suggestion and might instead be better explained by the property of constituent dropping.

In addition to occurring with NPs, *da* can also take adverbials marked with the adverbializer =*e(n)* as its argument, see (38) and (39).

- (38) arapa dûsû'chu=aka=en da
 chicken egg=CMP=ADVR become
 'They became something like chicken eggs.'
 (BC17.114)

- (39) thuthu=pa=tshi=khu=e da kûsepa-u=nga
 white=SS=QUAL=AUG=ADVR become ash=ADVR=DAT
 ise-ye=pa
 color PASS=SS
 'She had become all whitish where the ashes had gotten on her.'
 (BC08.084)

(38) and (39) show that, even though the adverbial expressions encode a state that is not realized yet as second arguments of *da*, there is no marking of irrealis as there is in the nominal second arguments of *da* in (32)–(34). The encoding of (ir)reality is only possible on nominal but not on adverbial second arguments.

5.3 Depictives in A'ingae

Whereas it is unclear if NPs marked for accusative 2 in resultative expressions are secondary predicates or the second argument of transitive verbs, one can find several examples in A'ingae where depictive secondary predicates take the accusative 2 clitic. Such an example is (40). Here the predication is modified by a participant-oriented adjunct *thuthu-je=ve* describing the quality of the fish emerging from the tree. This depictive takes the accusative 2 clitic *=ve* despite not being a second argument of a transitive verb.

- (40) veyara veyara thuthu-je=ve veyara
 sparkling sparkling white-NR.FLT=ACC2 sparkling
 sumbu tsa'khû-jin=un
 emerge water-NR.LRG=ADVR
 ‘Sparkling, sparkling, sparkling white they (fish) came out of the water tree.’
 (BC02.022)

The depictive use of the accusative 2 can co-occur with other uses in one utterance, as (41) shows. The resultative predicate *a'i=ve da* is modified by the depictive *kunshu=a=me*. This secondary predicate describes the way in which this change of state takes place. Note that the two elements *kunshu=a=me* and *a'i=ve* do not form one NP together where ‘hurry’ would modify ‘person’ since there is no case agreement with an NP and the accusative 2 marker encliticizes only once to the right of an (internally complex) NP (see Section 3).

- (41) andûpa undikhû'je kunshu=a=me a'i=ve da
 bead cushma hurry=ADJR=ACC2 person=ACC2 become
 ‘Putting on beads and a cushma³ he hurriedly became a Cofán.’
 (BC12.086)

In example (42), the subject ‘river’ has been dropped because it was clear from the discourse context. The predication *ai'je* ‘it (= the river) flows’ is modified by a secondary predicate consisting of the adjective *ki'an* ‘rapid’ taking the

³ The cushma is a traditional piece of garment worn by the Cofán people.

accusative 2 clitic. What is interesting here is that two readings are possible. The secondary predicate can be interpreted as being event-oriented describing the way of flowing or as participant-oriented qualifying the non-overt participant ‘river’. In the latter case it would be a depictive, in the former it would be more adverbial in nature. This ambiguity is noteworthy, but not especially surprising since cross-linguistically the formal domains of depictives and adverbials can vary language-specifically and more prototypically ‘adverbial’ meanings can formally be expressed the same way as depictives even if there are dedicated adverbial forms available in a given language (Schultze-Berndt & Himmelmann 2004).

- (42) ki'an=me ai'je
 rapid=ACC2 flow
 ‘It (the river) flows fast.’
 (BC13.066)

5.4 Purposives

The accusative 2 clitic is furthermore used in a construction that I have labelled as purposive. In these constructions, verbs of movement such as *ja* ‘to go’ appear with an NP marked for accusative 2, as in (43) and (44). These NPs encode the object of some implied event of searching or gathering that is the purpose of the movement. They are not an obligatory complement since *ja* can also stand alone when no such purposive action is implied. This can be seen in (45) where three instances of this verb each form a full-fledged predicate without a p-argument.

- (43) khien asi'tha-en=mba si'tsi=ve ja-yi
 thus think-CAUS=SS firewood=ACC2 go-PROSP
 ‘Thus having thought, (she decided), ‘I’ll go to get firewood.’
 (BC24.008)

- (44) kani ju=ni-fa=ni kuye=ve ja
 yesterday DIST=LOC-NR.LAT=LOC plantain=ACC2 go
 ‘Yesterday she went across the river (to look) for plantains.’
 (BC12.015)

- (45) tsun=si chhaje=in ja=si tise=khe ja=pa
do=DS fly=SIM go=DS 3SG=ADD go=SS
sû na=khe ja-yi
say 1SG=ADD go-PROSP
‘When she had gone flying, he also came (and thought), ‘I shall go.’’
(BC23.1.013)

The occurrence of purposive adjuncts is not restricted to *ja*, but they can also occur with other verbs of movement such as *ji* ‘to come’, as in (46), or *jakan* ‘to travel’, as in (47).

- (46) chan afa junguesû=ve=ki ji=fa
mother say IGN.INAN=ACC2=2 come=PLS
‘Their mother said, ‘Why/for what did you come?’’
(BC08.068)

- (47) dyai=si va=ni=sû a'i afa
sit=DS PROX=LOC=ATTR person say
junguesû=e=ki jakan
IGN.INAN=ACC2=2 travel
‘When he had sat down, the people asked, ‘Why/for what have you travelled here?’’
(BC12.070)

Moreover, verbs of movement like *ja* can take another (transitive) verb expressing the purpose of the movement under its scope as in (48) or (49). The p-argument of the transitive verb *thatha* receives marking for accusative 1 or accusative 2 depending on its reality status just like the regular cases discussed in Section 4.

- (48) khaki fûe=sû kankhe=ve thatha-ye
next_day other=ATTR village=ACC2 search-INF
ja fithi'~thi-ye
go kill~ITER-INF
‘The next day he went to search for another village to kill them.’
(BC12.107)

- (49) a'i pûshesû atesû=mbi=e kuye=ve
 people woman know=NEG=ADVR plantain=ACC2
 thatha ja-yi
 search go-PROSP
 'Without knowing it, the Cofán woman went to search for plantains.'
 (BC12.006)

This means that there are two possible explanations for the purposive constructions involving a verb of movement in (43)–(47). The first one is that in those examples the NPs marked with the accusative 2 clitic are in fact the p-arguments of a verb like *thatha* that has been dropped. A second explanation is that, based on this suppression of a constituent, the accusative 2 marker in combination with a verb of movement has been grammaticalized to express a purposive function on an NP. Evidence for this function of the accusative 2 marker, which does not express (ir)reality, comes from cases like (50). In this example the predicate *ji* 'to come' occurs with an argument *kachapa* 'parrot' marked for accusative 2. This clitic, however, does not express irreality of the referent since this specific parrot had been present in the discourse context and therefore cannot be asserted to be unreal neither from a relative nor an absolute reference time. Instead, the accusative 2 clitic has the function to mark the objective expressed in the lexical verb.

- (50) kachapa=ve=ngi ji
 parrot=ACC2=1 come
 'We came to get the parrot.'
 (BC08.069)

A similar situation also applies in (51). Here, *ji* 'to come' takes a nominal argument marked for accusative 2. Again, this clitic cannot be expressing reality status as the person referred to by the personal pronoun must be asserted to be real both from a relative and an absolute perspective. The function of the marker in this example is to express the purpose of the movement express by the predicate.

- (51) ke=ve=ngi ji
 2.sg=acc2=1 come
 'I have come for you.'
 (BC26.099)

In (52), the pronoun *ñā* referring to the speaker himself, which necessarily must be asserted to be real by the speaker, takes the accusative 2 clitic. This again

suggests that it is not reality status, but rather a purposive argument that is marked here.

- (52) ma=ni ña=me in'jan=mba ñuame ñumbiye=pa
 Q1=LOC 1.SG=ACC2 desire=SS truly be_good=SS
 sethapuen=nda a'tû khen='sû
 sing=NEW hide thus=ATTR
 'Where's the one hidden herself who desiring me longingly sang?'
 (BC24.028)

However, in some other examples the verb *in'jan* 'to want' does not take an NP but rather an infinitive as its argument, as shown in (53).⁴ If we now compare these two examples, it seems to be the case that in (52) it is not *in'jan* itself but a suppressed verb of movement under the scope of *in'jan* that triggers the use of the accusative 2 clitic on the pronoun to mark the purpose of the movement.

- (53) an-ye in'jan=mbi thupa iñe=si
 eat-INF desire=NEG stomach hurt=DS
 'I don't want to eat and my stomach hurts.'
 (BC17.028)

In either case, all of the purposive constructions encode relative rather than absolute irrealis as the existence of the nominal referents remains unclear until the event has taken place.

5.5 Relation of other uses to p-argument marking

As illustrated in the previous section, the accusative 2 clitic =*ve*/=*me*, apart from the prototypical use to mark p-arguments of transitive verbs for irrealis, has several other semantic functions. I will here propose diachronic pathways in which the latter uses result from the former. Following Heine (2002: 84–86), what is crucial for grammaticalization are the so-called 'bridging contexts'. In a certain context a specific grammatical expression may be ambiguous in the sense that it allows both a reading as its conventional 'source meaning' and as a new 'target meaning'. Starting from these ambiguous contexts, the use of the form can be extended to contexts where only the 'target meaning' is possible. When this

⁴ There are seven examples in the corpus where *in'jan* occurs with an infinitive and three examples where it takes an NP marked for accusative 2 under its scope, all of which are first person pronouns.

function of the form is subsequently conventionalized, it acquires a status of a grammatical form independent of the original ‘source meaning’.

The semantic connection between the use of accusative 2 in resultative constructions and as p-argument as discussed in Section 4 is obvious. The NP expressing the result of the change is not real until the State-of-affairs expressed by the predicate *da* or *di'sha* has been completed. This means that the accusative 2 clitic is used to encode irreality on NPs in resultative constructions, as well.

The semantic connection between the prototypical use of the accusative 2 to express (ir)reality of p-arguments and that to encode depictives is somewhat less straight-forward. Whereas some accusative 2 marked elements, like the ones in (40) and (41) can be argued to carry some irreality meaning in the sense that at least the predications in which they occur convey a change of state, this not the case for (42). Here a real, unchanged referent is modified by an accusative 2 marked secondary predicate, since it is referring to a river that exists at the moment of speaking. Diachronically, the use of the clitic *=ve/=me* could have extended from secondary predicates clearly expressing irreality such as in resultatives, given the assumption that they are secondary predicates, to cases like (40) and (41) where irreality is involved but not necessarily conveyed by the secondary predicate itself. In a next step, the function of the accusative 2 clitic could then have been extended to also mark any depictive as in (42).

The general property of A'ingae to suppress clausal constituents facilitated the grammaticalization of the accusative 2 clitic in so-called purposive constructions. In two steps, it might have grammaticalized from expressing irreality on p-arguments to expressing the purpose of a movement in purposive constructions. The first step of this possible grammaticalization cline are examples like (48) and (49). In these constructions, a verb expressing a movement takes a transitive verb under its scope, the argument of which in turn is marked for irreality. The next step arguably are examples like (43)–(47). Here, the verb under the scope of the verb of movement is suppressed, which renders these examples ambiguous. A verb of movement occurs with a nominal argument taking the accusative 2 clitic. This results in two possible readings: the clitic can both be understood to express irreality of the referent or to encode the NP as the purpose of the movement indicated by the verb. These bridging contexts, in turn, pave the way for instances where only the purposive reading but not that of irreality is viable. In (50) and (51) the NPs marked for accusative 2 can only be interpreted as the purposive arguments of the verbs of movement, since a reading of irreality of the nominal referents is logically impossible in the given discourse contexts.

6 Discussion and conclusions

To conclude, the binary case clitic system of p-arguments in A'ingae with the accusative 1 clitic =*ma* and the accusative 2 clitic =*ve*/= *me* has the main function to express the reality status of the nominal second arguments of transitive and ditransitive verbs. Accusative 1 grammatically encodes the real existence of these nominal referents, whereas accusative 2 marks their irreality. This dichotomy is the expression of an intrinsically nominal category and is independent from the verbal domain, although the semantics of the predicate can play a role in the (ir)reality status of the nominal referent. This means that the accusative marking of A'ingae is best analyzed as the grammatical expression of nominal mood or, more specifically, nominal (ir)reality status. Based on Elliott's (2000: 66–67) definition of verbal realis and irrealis (see Section 2), the two grammemes of nominal mood in A'ingae can be defined the following way: Nominal realis presents the existence of a referent as an actualized or certain fact of reality, whereas nominal irrealis presents the existence of a referent as imagined or hypothetical.

In the marking of irreality, there is a clear preference for relative irreality to be encoded. For the marking of reality status, no such clear tendency can be found. Both the marking of absolute and relative reality is possible. In most of the cases, however, the use of the accusative 1 clitic is ambiguous as to whether it encodes relative or absolute reality of the nominal referent. This is because as long as there is no change of state of the nominal referent involved, reality status is the same judged both from the time of the State-of-affairs and from the moment of speaking.

Apart from encoding irreality of p-arguments, the accusative 2 clitic =*ve*/= *me* has several other functions in A'ingae: it marks the result of a change of state in resultative constructions with the predicates *da* or *di'sha*, depictive secondary predicates and the second argument in purposive constructions involving a verb of movement. While in the case of the nominal arguments in resultative constructions and some purposive constructions the accusative 2 clitic can be argued to express irreality status, this is not the case for some other nominal arguments in purposives and for depictives. Here, instead, the grammaticalization of the clitic to express the semantic function of purpose and to express depictive secondary predicates starting from a more prototypical use of the accusative 2 can be assumed. An alternative explanation, at least for the use as depictives, is to see the clitic =*ve*/= *me* as a homophonous, but different element from the accusative 2 marker.⁵

⁵ This view is supported by the fact that in depictive use, e.g., in (41) and (42) =*ve* readily cliticizes to bare adjectives, whereas this is not attested for other uses of =*ve*.

Whereas (ir)reality status is usually treated as a verbal category in the literature, this paper has argued that in A'ingae mood is encoded in the nominal domain and is an intrinsically nominal category in this language. Cross-linguistically this is somewhat uncommon. Elliott (2000) and Noonan (2007) at least imply that in most languages (ir)reality status is exclusively marked in the verbal domain. However, A'ingae is not the only language where it is a nominal category. The Tangkic language Kayardild spoken in Australia has a set of markers that Evans (1995) calls 'modal case'. Several categories of tense, aspect and mood can be expressed on NPs. Like the system in A'ingae this marking is independent from that of the verb. The modal case markers of Kayardild are restricted in their combinability and can only occur on objects and on instrumentals. In objects they are the only marking the NP takes; there is no dedicated accusative marker. In instrumental NPs, they are suffixed to the right of the instrumental case marker (Evans 1995: 2). This is illustrated in (54). Both the object NP and the instrumental NP are marked for 'modal ablative' expressing posteriority of the referent. This is in line with the verbal tense marking, which expressing the situatedness of the event in the past.

(54) Kayardild (Tangkic)

dangka-a	raa-jarra	bijarrba-na	wumburu-nguni-na
man-NOM	spear-PST	dugong-MABL	spear-INSTR-MABL

'The man speared the dugong with a spear.'

(Evans 1995: 2)

The TAM features of NPs encoded by modal case do not necessarily have to match with those of the verb (Evans 1995: 3). In (55), the 'modal locative' encodes the object NP as being actualized, whereas the apprehensive verbal inflection asserts the predicate as not realized yet.

(55) Kayardild (Tangkic)

thararr-a	kali-nyarra	wambal-iya,	naa-nyarr.
ember-NOM	jump-APPR	bush-MLOC	burn-APPR

'(Look out), the embers are jumping into the bush, it might catch fire.'

(Evans 1995: 3)

The modal case system of Kayardild is similar to that of A'ingae outlined in this paper in several respects. In both languages, the nominal marking is in principle independent from that of the predicate, making it a nominal category. The system of Kayardild, however, is more elaborate. A'ingae only marks (ir)reality status, i.e. mood, on NPs. In Kayardild, on the other hand, the system includes functions of mood, tense and aspect that can be expressed on NPs. As opposed to the two

markers of A'ingae expressing reality and irreality, Kayardild has five modal cases expressing the following 'modalities': instantiated, future, prior, emotive and directed (Evans 1995: 110).

Another similarity is that both systems are defective in the sense that mood/'modal case' cannot be formally encoded on all NPs. In A'ingae, its distribution is restricted to second arguments of transitive and ditransitive verbs (and by extension to some other contexts) and in Kayardild modal case only occurs on objects and instrumentals. In neither of the two languages, nominal mood can be expressed on subjects, although this would be logically as viable as its encoding on NPs of other syntactic functions.

In conclusion, A'ingae has a nominal mood system with the grammemes reality and irreality formally encoded by the accusative 1 clitic =*ma* and the accusative 2 clitic =*ve*=*me*. The expression of this formal distinction is restricted to p-arguments. Cross-linguistically, the expression of mood as a nominal category is somewhat uncommon, but not unique to A'ingae as was demonstrated by the case of the Tangkic language Kayardild.

7 Abbreviations

ACC1	accusative 1	MLOC	modal locative
ACC2	accusative 2	NEG	negation
ADD	additive focus	NEGP	negative predicate
ADJR	Adjectivalizer	NEW	new topic
ADVR	Adverbializer	NOM	nominative
APPR	Apprehensive	NR	nominalizer
ATTR	Attributive	NR.ANG	nominalizer angular shape
AUG	Augmentative	NR.DEL	nominalizer delimited shape
CAUS	Causative	NR.FLT	nominalizer flat shape
CMP	Comparative	NR.LAT	nominalizer lateral shape
DAT	Dative	NR.LRG	nominalizer large shape
DEF	definite article	NR.RND	nominalizer round shape
DIST	Distal	PASS	passive
DS	different subject cosubordinator	PLS	plural subject
DUR	Durative	PFV	perfective
FRUS	Frustrative	PROSP	prospective
FUT	Future	PROX	proximal
H.PL	human plural	PRS	present
IGN	Ignorative	PST	past
IMPF	Imperfect	QUAL	quality
INAN	Inanimate	REFL	reflexive

IND	Indicative	SIM	simultaneous
INF	Infinitive	SIMIL	similative
IRR	verbal irrealis	SS	same subject cosubordinator
ITER	Iterative	SUB	subordinator
LOC	Locative	SUBJ	subjunctive
MABL	modal ablative		

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